---
title: unconditional cash transfers always have a condition
canonical_url: https://ensurance.app/guide/unconditional-cash-transfers-always-have-a-condition
markdown_url: https://ensurance.app/guide/unconditional-cash-transfers-always-have-a-condition.md
subtitle: "no strings on how the money is spent, but always a rule about who gets it. three conservation examples, and where that rule belongs"
category: nature-finance
---

# unconditional cash transfers always have a condition

*no strings on how the money is spent, but always a rule about who gets it. three conservation examples, and where that rule belongs*

An unconditional cash transfer asks nothing of the person who receives it. Someone still decides who counts as a recipient, for how long, and whether the money keeps coming. That decision is the condition, and every program has one. The question is where it lives.

Below: what an unconditional cash transfer is, three conservation and climate examples and the condition each still keeps, the evidence for and against, and where [**ensurance**](https://ensurance.app/?from=guide) puts the condition instead.

## what an unconditional cash transfer is

An **unconditional cash transfer** is money paid straight to a person or household, with no requirement about how it is spent and no action, result or behaviour required to receive it. A **conditional cash transfer** pays only if the household meets an obligation. Indonesia's national anti-poverty program, Program Keluarga Harapan, is one example: it "transfers cash conditional on households meeting health and education obligations."

The version for nature and climate is called a **basic income for nature and climate (BINC)**. Its proponents describe it, in an IUCN blog, as "regular unconditional payments to communities near critical conservation or climate areas to support sustainable livelihoods," and they are clear about what it is not: "BINC does not tie payments to specific behaviors or economic valuation of natural resources." For the fuller case and what it leaves unfunded, read [what a conservation basic income leaves unfunded](/guide/what-a-conservation-basic-income-leaves-unfunded?from=guide).

## where unconditional cash is right

Conditions cost money to police. Someone has to check the school register, count the trees or audit the patrol log, and that budget comes out of the payment. Conditions also move power to the payer, who decides what counts as compliance. And the people who live beside a forest or a rangeland usually know better than a distant program officer what that place needs this season.

So the case for dropping the condition on the recipient is strong. The mistake is thinking the condition has gone.

## three places the condition hides

### 1. eligibility by place

The forest decides who is paid, because the program is drawn around it. In the Peruvian Amazon, Cool Earth managed a pilot, co-developed with two Indigenous women's organizations, that the University of Bath describes as "an unconditional basic income": 211 people in three communities received cash they could "spend as they liked," equal to about £2 a day, for two years.

Nothing was asked of those 211 people once they were in. The condition was being in: living in one of three communities beside a forest that mattered to the program. That is not a flaw. Every program has to decide who. But the payer drew the line, and anyone outside it was not paid.

### 2. unconditional first, then a landscape index

One 2026 design in Kenya pays two years of unconditional cash, then a dividend from an invested fund that its public description calls "a collective incentive indexed to ecological performance at landscape level, rather than individual behaviour."

The first two years are unconditional. After that, the landscape's measured ecological performance sets the dividend. No one person has to do anything, but the group is paid on the landscape's result: a group-level payment for results, with a grace period. It may be a good design. A grace period could answer a real problem if people need security before they can change how they use land. But it is not unconditional.

### 3. anti-poverty eligibility with a conservation side effect

The forest was never in the terms. Indonesia's Program Keluarga Harapan pays poor households on health and education obligations. Ferraro and Simorangkir (2020) note that the program "has no direct link to conservation," yet estimate that it reduced tree cover loss in participating villages by an estimated 30% (95% confidence interval, 10 to 50%), with about half the avoided loss in primary forest.

One researcher who has made the case for a conservation basic income, quoted by Mongabay, called it "essentially unconditional with respect to conservation outcomes." The program had conditions: poverty targeting to get in, and health and education obligations to stay in. None was about forests. The forest benefit came through the household budget, not through any rule about the forest.

| form | unconditional on | still conditional on | example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Targeted by place | Behaviour and spending | Living in the chosen area | The Peru pilot |
| Unconditional, then indexed | The first two years | A landscape index after that | A 2026 Kenya design |
| Anti-poverty, side effect | Any conservation term | Poverty and program obligations | Program Keluarga Harapan |

## the evidence, for and against

For: Indonesia's program reduced tree cover loss as a side benefit, and the authors note that the value of the avoided carbon emissions alone "compares favorably to program implementation costs." The Peru pilot reported promising environmental practices; [what cash transfers for conservation showed in the Peruvian Amazon](/guide/what-cash-transfers-for-conservation-showed-in-peru?from=guide) reads that evaluation and its limits in full.

Against: Mongabay reports that studies in Sierra Leone and Mexico "have shown that, at least in the short term, cash transfers can lead to spikes in land clearance and deforestation." And GiveDirectly's own recap of its conservation workshop says: "There's strong data on cash's impacts on income and food security, but far less on ecological outcomes."

## where ensurance puts the condition

The watershed, the forest and the rangeland exist whether or not anyone buys anything, and so do the species on them and the people who keep them. Ensurance is how money reaches them. The account is not the place, and what it receives is not what the place is worth.

Ensurance asks nothing of the recipient and gives those who pay a public record to read.

1. **Every agent has an account.** In ensurance, a place, a purpose or a person can be represented by an **agent**, and each agent has an account where money can land.
2. **Proceeds land there with nothing to qualify for.** **Ensurance proceeds** are what the protocol routes through its **splits**, public contracts that divide incoming money by fixed shares, to agent accounts. We call them **universal BASIN income**, or uBi. The agent does not have to hold anything, do anything or qualify for anything. There is no list of residents and no eligibility check. An account receives only what the splits route to it, and someone sets each split. That is a choice too, made in a public contract anyone can read, not in a register of people.
3. **Claims and evidence can be read against any account, after the fact.** A funder can see what an account claims and what has been observed, and decide whether to keep paying.
4. **Land comes first in the order we design for.** The land's own account first, then its species and flows, then its people.

Two payments sit near each other here, and they are not the same. Buying a certificate or a line is **direct funding**: the price goes to the agent it names, which is a purchase, not a basic income and not proceeds. **Proceeds** are the uBi leg. Holding a certificate is not a payout: buying one funds the agent it names. The splits that decide who receives proceeds are onchain, and that record is the truth, not anything we write about it: the [proceeds viewer](/proceeds?from=guide) shows who receives what.

So the condition did not disappear. It moved to the funder's choice to keep paying, informed by a record anyone can read. Evidence informs that choice; it does not stop a payment, claw one back or freeze an account. A cash-transfer program, a foundation or a government can be one of those funders, alongside those who depend on the place and could invest in it. Paying into a place's account would be direct funding, not proceeds. Public social protection stays exactly as real as it was.

Two limits. First, no amount, rate or schedule is promised: proceeds have the shape of a basic income, not the guarantee of one. Second, no evaluation, ours or anyone's, has tested proceeds by account against any outcome, ecological or human.

:::johnson
**the condition does not disappear. it moves.**

Eligibility, an index or poverty targeting with program obligations puts it on the recipient. An account puts it with whoever pays, who reads a public record and decides whether to keep paying.

[give without strings and still see where the money goes →](/guide/give-without-strings-and-see-where-the-money-goes?from=guide)
:::

## frequently asked questions

### what is an unconditional cash transfer?

Money paid directly to a person or household with no requirement on how it is spent and no action required to receive it. The recipient still has to be eligible: a place, an income level or a program boundary usually decides who is paid.

### do unconditional cash transfers work for conservation?

Sometimes, and the evidence is mixed. Indonesia's anti-poverty program, which is conditional on health and education but not on forests, reduced tree cover loss as a side benefit, and the Peru pilot reported promising practices. Studies of cash transfers in Sierra Leone and Mexico found short-term spikes in clearing. Data on income and food security is far stronger than data on ecological outcomes.

### what is the difference between conditional and unconditional cash transfers?

A conditional transfer pays only when the household meets an obligation, such as health check-ups or school attendance. An unconditional transfer asks nothing per payment. Both still set a condition on who receives, and some unconditional designs add a collective condition later, such as a landscape index.

## next step

If you fund cash transfers or stewardship and want the money to stay unconditional for the people who receive it, while you can still read where it goes, [foundations](/solutions/foundations?from=guide&topic=universal-basin-income) is the page that shows how a funder builds durable funding and long-term monitoring around a place.

## the series

Universal BASIN income: an account for every place, purpose and person. Six posts.

1. [what a universal basic income for nature would take](/guide/what-a-universal-basic-income-for-nature-would-take?from=guide): start here
2. [unconditional cash transfers always have a condition](/guide/unconditional-cash-transfers-always-have-a-condition?from=guide): where the condition hides
3. [what the permanent fund dividend teaches conservation](/guide/what-the-permanent-fund-dividend-teaches-conservation?from=guide): pay from the earnings, keep the principal
4. [two payments people call a conservation dividend](/guide/direct-funding-proceeds-and-distributions-are-three-payments?from=guide): which money goes to whom
5. [give without strings and still see where the money goes](/guide/give-without-strings-and-see-where-the-money-goes?from=guide): the record anyone can read
6. [open an account for the place you keep](/guide/open-an-account-for-the-place-you-keep?from=guide): how to open one

## sources

[Ferraro and Simorangkir 2020, "Conditional cash transfers to alleviate poverty also reduced deforestation in Indonesia," *Science Advances* 6(24)](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7292618/) — Program Keluarga Harapan's health and education conditions; 30% reduction in tree cover loss (95% CI 10 to 50%); about half in primary forest; avoided-carbon value compared with program costs

[Fletcher et al., IUCN, 16 May 2025, "Transformative Justice in Conservation Finance: Basic Income for Nature and Climate (BINC)"](https://iucn.org/node/43845) — BINC definition; "does not tie payments to specific behaviors or economic valuation of natural resources"

[University of Bath, 20 October 2026, "World-first basic income trial boosts Indigenous livelihoods and Amazon rainforest protection"](https://www.bath.ac.uk/announcements/world-first-basic-income-trial-boosts-indigenous-livelihoods-and-amazon-rainforest-protection/) — 211 people in three communities, managed by Cool Earth, unconditional, spent as they liked, about £2 a day, two years, close to 90% adopting environmentally beneficial practices

[Conservation Finance Alliance, Incubator Round 4 finalists](https://www.conservationfinancealliance.org/incubator-round4-finalists) — the Kenya design: an initial two-year unconditional cash transfer, then a dividend from fund returns indexed to ecological performance at landscape level

[Mongabay, 13 June 2023, "Can community payments with no strings attached benefit biodiversity?"](https://news.mongabay.com/2023/06/can-community-payments-with-no-strings-attached-benefit-biodiversity/) — Emiel de Lange (WCS) calling Indonesia's program "essentially unconditional with respect to conservation outcomes"; short-term spikes in clearing in Sierra Leone and Mexico

[GiveDirectly, 27 June 2025, "Event: what if conservation started with trust?"](https://www.givedirectly.org/conservation-workshop-2025) — recap of its Cash for Conservation workshop: strong data on income and food security, far less on ecological outcomes
