---
title: "natural flood management: the field is the infrastructure"
canonical_url: https://ensurance.app/guide/natural-flood-management-the-field-is-the-infrastructure
markdown_url: https://ensurance.app/guide/natural-flood-management-the-field-is-the-infrastructure.md
subtitle: "ponds, hedgerows and woodland upstream slow the water. in Lancashire, five parties who gain from that committed money to it"
category: nature-finance
---

# natural flood management: the field is the infrastructure

*ponds, hedgerows and woodland upstream slow the water. in Lancashire, five parties who gain from that committed money to it*

**Natural flood management** slows, stores and soaks up rainfall in the upper catchment, before it reaches towns below, using ponds, leaky dams, hedgerows, woodland, wetland and reconnected floodplain. It lowers or delays the flood peak downstream, most on smaller, frequent floods. A wet field upstream protects a water company's treatment works below it, and that company is a natural investor in the field.

The field does the work. When it doesn't, people downstream already spend money on the flood: the water company whose treatment works goes under, the railway that rebuilds a culvert, the insurer that settles the claims, the council that clears the road. In the Wyre catchment in Lancashire, five parties who gain from slower water committed money to the fields upstream.

:::johnson
**the field upstream is the flood defence; what downstream already spends on floods could be invested in it.**

Natural flood management gets built when the people who gain from slower water choose, in writing and on a schedule, to invest in the land that slows it.

[read the series hub →](/guide/the-adaptation-gap-is-a-payer-gap?from=guide)
:::

## what natural flood management is

England's evidence base calls it working with natural processes. The measures are plain and old: a **leaky dam** of logs across a stream that holds water back in a storm and lets it through in normal flow; an offline **pond or scrape** that fills when the channel rises; a **bunded hedgerow** that stops water running straight downhill; **woodland**, whose soils soak up more water and whose trees slow it; and a **floodplain reconnected** to its river so the river can spread out where nobody lives.

None stops a flood alone. Hundreds of them, placed where modelling says they count, take the top off the peak and buy hours. The Environment Agency updated its evidence directory in February 2025: 17 measures, more than 700 papers. On Littlestock Brook in Oxfordshire, combined measures cut flood height by up to 55.2% across the storms analysed. In Cumbria, one study found flood flow slowed 14–50% in woodland compared with pasture.

The honest limit belongs here, not in a footnote. The same release says woodland gives "the greatest reductions during smaller events." Natural flood management is strongest on frequent floods in small and medium catchments. It does not replace a wall at the bottom of a big river in a once-a-century storm. It lowers how often the wall is tested, and how hard.

For the city-scale version, see [nature-based solutions for urban flooding](/guide/urban-flooding-nature-based-solutions?from=guide). For the field-by-field how-to, see [how to slow flash floods](/guide/how-to-slow-flash-floods-nature-based-solutions?from=guide).

## the wyre: five buyers, one set of fields

In 2015 Storm Desmond struck; GFI puts it at 5,200 flooded homes. Churchtown, a village on the River Wyre in north Lancashire, was among the places hit. The catchment had seen what the Green Finance Institute (GFI) describes as a one-in-50-year flood four times in 20 years.

United Utilities, Flood Re, the Environment Agency and The Rivers Trust began exploring the idea in 2016, per GFI (Triodos dates the project's start to 2019). Triodos announced the financing in May 2022.

What got built, per the GFI case study: 39 hectares of new woodland, 1,710 leaky dams, 42 ponds and scrapes, and 10 km of bunded hedgerow, across more than 70 hectares on more than ten land holdings, and about 30 farmers had signed up by late 2023. Farmers host the measures under a nine-year agreement that can extend to 20–50 years. They receive an annual payment linked to inflation, handle day-to-day maintenance, gave no security and are not liable for the loan.

The money, as the primary sources give it:

| item | figure | source |
|---|---|---|
| Buyers | Flood Re, United Utilities, the Environment Agency, Wyre Council, Northwest Regional Flood and Coastal Committee | GFI |
| Buyer payments | about £2m over nine years | GFI |
| Up-front loan | £850k, nine years, arranged by Triodos Bank UK from impact funds and individual investors | GFI |
| Grant | £627,500 from the Woodland Trust for trees and hedgerows | GFI |
| Modelled benefit | 5–15% less flood impact (10% used in modelling), estimated by United Utilities | GFI |
| Outcome payments | start in year six, after the Wyre Rivers Trust verifies performance following weather events | GFI |
| Headline at launch | £1.5m invested | Triodos, 2022 |

A not-for-profit company in the middle holds the contracts with buyers and farmers and carries the loan, keeping the risk off the charities.

The McKinsey Global Institute's *Advancing adaptation* (November 2026) uses Wyre as one of six case examples and tells it the same way: five beneficiaries, about £2m of contracted payments supporting a nine-year £850k loan, a £627.5k grant alongside it, 5–15% modelled flood reduction, and future payments tied to monitoring. For how a loan, a grant and buyer payments sit together, see [where you sit in a blended finance stack](/guide/where-you-sit-in-a-blended-finance-stack?from=guide).

Two GFI details matter more than the headline. United Utilities agreed an annualised payment schedule modelled over about 120 years, the measures' expected life. And GFI says plainly that payments for the flood benefit alone would not have been enough to make the project viable.

Our reading: none of the five was handed a new bill by anyone else. Each already lost money when the Wyre flooded, through claims, damaged works, emergency response and repair. They chose to put part of that money into the land upstream, before the next flood, instead of after it.

## why most of these deals don't close

Here is the same idea failing. In a case retold secondhand by the FloodAction Coalition from a UK nature-finance talk, five organisations on one river (a railway, an energy network, a water company, a developer and a council) each had a flood problem and agreed on five upstream attenuation ponds. The deal fell apart on timing. The railway had a two-month spending window. The developer needed an answer before planning consent. The council works to annual budgets, the water company to a five-year investment cycle. The railway went ahead and built its own drainage pipe. The account is secondhand, retold by the FloodAction Coalition, and the river was never named, so treat it as a pattern, not a case study.

Everyone agreed on the ponds. Nobody could commit money at the same moment.

Wyre closed because it solved that. Per GFI, buyers and land managers were engaged before outside investment was sought. Buyers make annual payments from year one, the loan is drawn over three years and repaid in years four to nine, and outcome payments start in year six. Investors fronted the build so each buyer could put money in on a schedule rather than in a lump.

So the gap in natural flood management is rarely the hydrology and rarely the willingness. It is a party that gains, with no place to invest on its own clock, and a field with no way to receive it. MGI makes the macro version of the point: adaptation pays society about three to one today and still goes unbuilt, because the party who spends is rarely the party who benefits. [The adaptation gap is an investor gap](/guide/the-adaptation-gap-is-a-payer-gap?from=guide) takes that up.

## the field is the infrastructure

In most flood budgets, nature shows up as a co-benefit: the scheme is a wall or a pipe, and a wetland earns a line for biodiversity. Wyre runs the other way. The woodland, the ponds and the hedgerows are the scheme. If they stop working, the flood benefit stops. [A feature is not the floodplain](/guide/a-feature-is-not-the-floodplain?from=guide) makes the same argument about US civil-works language.

That changes what the money is for. A buyer is not funding a project that ends at handover. It is investing in a parcel that keeps doing a job: soils that hold water, trees that grow into their role (Environment Agency modelling suggests woodland works better as it matures), ponds that stay clear. That is upkeep of a living asset, and it has to last as long as the risk does. A nine-year agreement on a 120-year benefit is a start.

The farmer is not a contractor here but the keeper of the asset. Fund the land's work first, then reward its keepers well: that order makes the asset last.

## how ensurance would hold this for a named parcel

Ensurance took no part in Wyre, and no contract of the Wyre kind runs on ensurance today. What follows is how the design works, not a track record.

**Start with the parcel.** Each upstream field or reach gets an account of its own: an agent that represents that place and the flood-slowing flow it provides. The parcel is the subject. The downstream parties are its dependents, and each is a possible investor in it.

**Start from money already spent.** A water company already budgets for flooded works, an insurer already settles flood claims, a council already pays for clean-up and repair. The design hands no one a new bill: it gives part of what they already spend on floods somewhere to go before the flood, the land that lowers it.

**Let each dependent invest on its own clock.** Each puts money in using its own accounting: a water company in its investment cycle, a council in its annual budget, an insurer on its own terms. They don't need to sign on the same day, because each contribution lands in the parcel's account when it is made, not when the last party agrees.

**Route proceeds continuously.** Money arriving for the parcel goes to the land's work first (the build, then the upkeep), and then to the people who keep it. The flows stay visible onchain, so everyone who put money in can see what it reached.

**Tie later money to what the field did.** Wyre ties year-six payments to monitored performance. [Parametric ensurance](/guide/what-parametric-ensurance-actually-does?from=guide) is designed to pay on measured conditions, which is a related idea. No parametric condition has paid out yet.

This does not answer the hardest question the failed case raises: who carries the risk that investors two to five never commit after the first has put money in. Wyre answered it by engaging every buyer before seeking investment. We haven't answered it yet. What the design does is give the first party somewhere to invest without waiting for the fifth.

Flood outcomes across places gather under the [flood-resilience.syndicate](/flood-resilience.syndicate?from=guide) agent. If you carry a flood exposure that depends on land you don't own, [funding a town's flood work by the unit](/guide/who-pays-for-a-towns-flood-work-by-the-unit?from=guide) works through one town's numbers.

## what this means for you

**A landowner or farmer:** your wettest corner may be worth more holding water than draining it. In Wyre, farmers received an annual, inflation-linked payment, kept their land, and took on no debt. Ask who downstream floods when your land sheds water fast, and see [the landowner path](/solutions/landowners?from=guide&topic=adaptation-gap).

**A water company or other utility:** you already price flood risk to your works in your investment plan. United Utilities agreed an annualised schedule modelled over about 120 years, agreeing a payment schedule to the land upstream.

**An insurer:** Flood Re, the reinsurance scheme, is one of the five buyers. It settles flood claims either way; in Wyre it contracted payments for upstream measures modelled to lower flood impact. United Utilities hoped the project would become a blueprint for others.

## frequently asked questions

### does natural flood management work?

Yes, within limits. The Environment Agency's 2025 evidence covers 17 measures and more than 700 papers, with the largest effects on smaller, frequent floods in small and medium catchments. It complements hard defences on big rivers rather than replacing them.

### how is natural flood management funded?

Mostly through public flood budgets and grants today. In Wyre, five beneficiaries (the flood reinsurance scheme, a water company, a national agency, a council and a regional flood committee) contracted about £2m of payments over nine years, which supported a private loan that funded the build, alongside a Woodland Trust grant. Each already bore flood losses; they chose to put money into the land that lowers them.

## talk it through

If you own land upstream of a flood problem, or already carry flood losses downstream of one, and want to think through which field you depend on and how you could invest in it, [get in touch](/contact?from=guide&topic=adaptation-gap).

## sources

[Green Finance Institute — The Wyre catchment natural flood management project](https://www.greenfinanceinstitute.com/hive/revenues-for-nature/case-studies/the-wyre-catchment-natural-flood-management-project/) — buyers, £2m payments, £850k loan, £627,500 Woodland Trust grant, 5–15% modelled reduction, 120-year schedule, year-six outcome payments, interventions, viability

[Green Finance Institute — Wyre River NFM project, initial scoping](https://hive.greenfinanceinstitute.com/gfihive/toolkit/initial-project-scoping/wyre-river-natural-flood-management-project) — Storm Desmond, one-in-50-year floods, 1,000+ measures

[Green Finance Institute — Wyre NFM, liability and risk management](https://hive.greenfinanceinstitute.com/gfihive/farming-toolkit/liability-and-risk-management/wyre-nfm/) — farmer hosting agreements, inflation-linked payments, no security

[Triodos Bank UK — first-of-its-kind £1.5m nature restoration project to reduce flood risk, 31 May 2022](https://triodos.co.uk/press-releases/2022/first-of-its-kind-gbp1.5m-nature-restoration-project-to-reduce-flood-risk) — launch, partners, 2019 start, Churchtown

[McKinsey Global Institute — Advancing adaptation: Breaking barriers to a trillion-dollar opportunity, November 2026](https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/Advancing-adaptation-Breaking-barriers-to-a-trillion-dollar-opportunity) — Wyre as case example; adaptation benefit about three times cost today

[Environment Agency — new evidence of natural flood management benefits, 12 February 2025](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/working-with-nature-to-boost-nations-flood-resilience-new-evidence-of-natural-flood-management-benefits) — 17 measures, 700+ papers, Littlestock Brook, Cumbria woodland, smaller events

## the series

- [the adaptation gap is an investor gap](/guide/the-adaptation-gap-is-a-payer-gap?from=guide)
- [eight reasons adaptation doesn't get built](/guide/eight-reasons-adaptation-does-not-get-built?from=guide)
- [natural flood management: the field is the infrastructure](/guide/natural-flood-management-the-field-is-the-infrastructure?from=guide)
- [value capture for the ground that protects you](/guide/value-capture-for-the-ground-that-protects-you?from=guide)
- [maladaptation moves the harm downstream](/guide/maladaptation-moves-the-harm-downstream?from=guide)
- [bankable adaptation starts with the people who gain](/guide/bankable-adaptation-starts-with-a-payer?from=guide)
