---
title: "eight reasons adaptation doesn't get built"
canonical_url: https://ensurance.app/guide/eight-reasons-adaptation-does-not-get-built
markdown_url: https://ensurance.app/guide/eight-reasons-adaptation-does-not-get-built.md
subtitle: "four on the side of whoever has to act, four on the side of whoever has to lend. half of them are the same problem"
category: nature-finance
---

# eight reasons adaptation doesn't get built

*four on the side of whoever has to act, four on the side of whoever has to lend. half of them are the same problem*

The barriers to climate adaptation are the reasons work that pays for itself still doesn't get built. McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) counts eight. Four sit with whoever has to act: competing priorities, a gap in perceived benefits, misaligned incentives and execution. Four sit with whoever has to lend: operational, revenue, counterparty and technology risk.

Take a floodplain above a town: a wet meadow that holds a storm for a day. The railway below it, the water company's intake and the insurer of the houses all lose less when it holds. None of them owns it, and the farmer who does is paid for hay, not for holding water. Each of them already spends money when the meadow fails: track repairs, extra treatment, flood claims. Run that one place through the list, and half of the eight turn out to be the same problem.

:::johnson
**most of the list is an investor nobody has asked.** — The people who gain from the meadow already carry its failures as losses. Give them a way to invest that money in the meadow instead, and most of the eight shrink. Two don't, and this post says which.

[start with the series hub →](/guide/the-adaptation-gap-is-a-payer-gap?from=guide)
:::

## the two-condition test behind the list

MGI's *Advancing adaptation* (November 2026) sizes 20 proven measures against heat, wildfire, drought and flooding. At 2°C by 2050, which it uses as a planning scenario rather than a forecast, protecting everyone exposed to developed-economy standards would cost about **$1.2 trillion a year**. Benefits run about three times costs today and about seven times at 2°C, and every measure in the model was screened at a benefit-to-cost ratio above 1.5.

That number is not a nature market. Active cooling, mostly air-conditioning, is 38% of it. Nature-based measures (urban trees, fuel management, swales, mangroves) add up to roughly a tenth.

So why isn't it built? MGI's answer is a two-condition test. Adaptation deploys only when someone **wants to act and is able to**, and someone **will finance it on acceptable terms**. Fail either and the work stalls. Of the $1.2 trillion, MGI counts about $460 billion a year as deployment-ready by 2050 and about $690 billion as not. The eight barriers are its account of why.

## four barriers on the side of whoever has to act

**1. Competing priorities.** A city, a farmer or a household has one budget, and schools, wages and debt come first. This is affordability, and it weighs most where incomes are lowest.

**2. A gap in perceived benefits.** Risk is invisible until the disaster. MGI's wildfire example, Austin Energy's detection pilots, exists largely to make the avoided loss visible.

**3. Misaligned incentives.** The one who funds the measure is rarely the one who gains. An agency builds a detention basin; the households, the insurer and the shops below it collect the benefit and have no way to put any of it back.

**4. Execution.** Approvals, land, and several agencies that each own a piece. MGI's Room for the River case, in the Netherlands, took more than a decade.

## four barriers on the side of whoever has to lend

**5. Operational risk.** The tickets are small and scattered: a roof here, a pond there, too small to finance one by one. Lenders stay away unless someone aggregates them.

**6. Revenue risk.** Avoided loss is real value and no cash flow. A sea dike or a detention basin earns nothing on a dry day, so there is nothing for a lender to lend against.

**7. Counterparty risk.** The borrower's credit. A city or a smallholder with a weak balance sheet cannot borrow on fair terms, whatever the project returns to society.

**8. Technology risk.** Will it perform? Lenders discount what has not been proven at the scale and in the place they are asked to fund. MGI assigns it no cost in its own sizing, because all 20 of its measures are proven.

## who hits which wall

The eight don't fall evenly. In lower-income regions the walls are **competing priorities and counterparty risk**. MGI finds counterparty risk is the main financing barrier for measures making up about 75% of adaptation costs in Sub-Saharan Africa, India and Emerging Asia, against about 10% in higher-income regions. Under 20% of Sub-Saharan Africa's and India's need is deployment-ready.

In higher-income regions the borrower is usually creditworthy. The walls are **misaligned incentives and revenue risk**: the agency can borrow, but the measure produces no revenue and the people it protects have no way to invest in it. More than 60% of the need in the EU-30 and the Middle East and North Africa is deployment-ready.

That matters when choosing a fix. A guarantee helps the first group. It does little for the second, whose problem is not credit but the people who gain, who have never been asked to invest.

## half of the eight are one problem

The railway, the water company and the insurer gain when the meadow holds water: misaligned incentives. None of them has a way to put money into it, so the gain never becomes revenue: revenue risk. Because nobody invests, nobody has a reason to count it, so the benefit stays invisible until the line washes out. That feeds the perceived-benefits gap, which MGI defines more broadly as limited awareness of risk. And the farmer's budget for keeping the meadow wet loses to everything else on the farm: competing priorities.

Four barriers, one cause in this place. That is our reading, not MGI's. MGI's largest bucket, about $440 billion, is affordability, and an investor in a neighbour's meadow does not fix it. **The people who gain have no way to invest in the source, and the place that does the work has no account to receive it.** Meanwhile they already spend: on repairs after the washout, on treatment when the river runs brown, on claims, and on grants and donations after the fact. Give them a way to invest that money in the meadow, by a unit they already book, into an account for the place, and two of those four become ordinary work: misaligned incentives and revenue risk. No one is handed a new bill; the money they already lose to damage would have somewhere better to go. Perceived benefits gets easier to see. Competing priorities eases only where the farmer's own budget is the constraint, because the farmer is no longer funding it alone.

On the lender's side, a committed schedule of investments from named parties is the cash flow that revenue risk said was missing. It does not cure counterparty or technology risk.

## the eight barriers against what ensurance does

[Ensurance](/guide/what-is-ensurance?from=guide) gives a place its own account through an agent, and is built so the parties who depend on that place can invest in it directly, each by its own unit and on its own budget cycle, with money they would otherwise lose to damage or give away after the fact. The protected or restored land is the infrastructure, not a side benefit of something built beside it. Here is how that meets each barrier, honest where the answer is "not ours."

| barrier | what ensurance does | honest limit |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Competing priorities | Lets the parties who gain invest alongside the keeper of the land, so the keeper's budget is not the only one | Makes no budget larger |
| 2. Perceived benefits | RealValue, our natural capital accounting engine, values the living work of a named place; tracing who depends on it, in both directions, is being built | Today RealValue values the place's flows. It does not yet show a dependent their own avoided loss; the two-way trace is being built |
| 3. Misaligned incentives | The core design: dependents invest in the source they rely on, into the place's own account | Dependents still have to choose to; nobody is compelled |
| 4. Execution | Field work (assess, restore, instrument, monitor) coordinated with partners; the land itself is the build | No delivery authority at national scale. Not levees, irrigation hardware or air-conditioning |
| 5. Operational risk | The place's account is designed to receive investments of any size; certificates, coins and groups pool many small ones. This answers collection cost on the investor side, not a lender's cost to originate loans | Rails don't create demand, and volume today is small |
| 6. Revenue risk | Investments from named dependents would be the cash flow; parametric ensurance is designed to pay on measured conditions | No signed multi-party contract of the Wyre kind (below) yet, and no parametric payout yet |
| 7. Counterparty risk | Several investors would stand where one borrower stood | Not offered today: no guarantee or first-loss cover |
| 8. Technology risk | A floodplain or a wetland is old technology; monitoring is part of the field work | Risk in engineered technology is not ours |

**Air-conditioning is 38% of MGI's number, and it is not ours.** Neither is irrigation hardware or levee engineering. Ensurance funds natural assets: the floodplain, the wetland, the canopy. That is a minority of MGI's cost.

**The best proof case is someone else's.** MGI's closed example of beneficiary payments is natural flood management in the Wyre catchment in Lancashire. Five beneficiaries agreed about £2 million of payments, which backed a nine-year £850,000 loan alongside a £627,500 grant. Monitoring is meant to inform future payments based on outcomes. Our reading: they chose to put money they would otherwise lose to floods into the land upstream. Ensurance took no part in it. [Post 3 tells that story](/guide/natural-flood-management-the-field-is-the-infrastructure?from=guide).

## how to run the list on one place

If you hold a flood, heat or drought budget, run the list on one place:

1. Name the living thing doing the work: the floodplain, the wetland, the canopy on a hot block.
2. List who loses less when it holds, what each already spends when it fails (claims, repairs, treatment, emergency grants), and the unit each already books (for example, per policy).
3. Ask which barrier actually stops the work. If it is credit, look for a guarantee. If it is that the people who gain have never been asked to invest, no guarantee will fix it.
4. Size each investment against what that party already loses, never above it, so no one is handed a new bill. [Split the bill for what lowers it](/guide/split-the-bill-for-what-lowers-it?from=guide) shows the arithmetic, and [who pays for a town's flood work, by the unit](/guide/who-pays-for-a-towns-flood-work-by-the-unit?from=guide) works it through for one town.

## why it matters now

MGI sizes two of its five responses as payment design: **realign incentives** at about $70 billion a year and **enable bankability** at about $40 billion, both at 2°C. Most of that is levees, irrigation and early warning, not nature. The largest response in MGI's sizing, about $440 billion, is cutting the cost of heat and drought measures in lower-income places. That is not an ensurance line. Still, in higher-income places, much of the work that returns three to one is waiting for the people who gain to be asked to invest, not for a new technology or a cheaper loan.

The ground that holds the water works every storm, whether anyone has invested in it or not.

## frequently asked questions

### what are the barriers to climate adaptation?

McKinsey Global Institute names eight. On the demand side: competing priorities, a gap in perceived benefits, misaligned incentives and execution challenges. On the financing side: operational, revenue, counterparty and technology risk. Adaptation gets built only when an implementer and a financier both clear their side.

### why doesn't adaptation get built if it pays three to one?

Because the return is spread across many parties, not whoever funds the work, and avoided loss produces no cash flow a lender can count. The parties who gain typically carry the losses and have no ready way to invest in what prevents them.

### which barriers matter most in high-income countries?

Misaligned incentives and revenue risk. The implementer can usually borrow, but the measure earns nothing and its beneficiaries have no way to invest in it. In lower-income regions, competing priorities and counterparty risk dominate.

### does ensurance solve counterparty risk?

No. Guarantees and first-loss cover are not offered today. It works on the investor side: the parties who depend on a natural asset can invest in it, into the place's own account, with money they would otherwise lose to damage.

## next steps

Next in the series: [natural flood management: the field is the infrastructure](/guide/natural-flood-management-the-field-is-the-infrastructure?from=guide), the Wyre case, and why five parties on five budget cycles is the hard part. To see how a place gets its own account, browse [natural assets](/natural-assets?from=guide). To talk through one place and who could invest in it, [get in touch](/contact?from=guide&topic=adaptation-gap).

## sources

[McKinsey Global Institute — Advancing adaptation: Breaking barriers to a trillion-dollar opportunity, November 2026](https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/Advancing-adaptation-Breaking-barriers-to-a-trillion-dollar-opportunity) — the eight barriers, the two-condition test, ~$1.2T a year at 2°C by 2050, ~$460B deployment-ready, benefit-to-cost ~3× today and ~7× at 2°C, the regional split, the five responses, and the case examples cited here

[Green Finance Institute — Wyre River natural flood management project](https://hive.greenfinanceinstitute.com/gfihive/toolkit/initial-project-scoping/wyre-river-natural-flood-management-project) — loan, grant and beneficiary payments

## the series

- [the adaptation gap is an investor gap](/guide/the-adaptation-gap-is-a-payer-gap?from=guide)
- [eight reasons adaptation doesn't get built](/guide/eight-reasons-adaptation-does-not-get-built?from=guide)
- [natural flood management: the field is the infrastructure](/guide/natural-flood-management-the-field-is-the-infrastructure?from=guide)
- [value capture for the ground that protects you](/guide/value-capture-for-the-ground-that-protects-you?from=guide)
- [maladaptation moves the harm downstream](/guide/maladaptation-moves-the-harm-downstream?from=guide)
- [bankable adaptation starts with the people who gain](/guide/bankable-adaptation-starts-with-a-payer?from=guide)
